Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance by Al-Fahad, Abdulaziz H.
Ornamental Constitutionalism:
The Saudi Basic Law of Governance
Abdulaziz H. AI-Fahadt
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 376
II. A TRAIL OF PROM ISES ................................................................................................................. 376
Ill. STATE-BUILDING: THE EARLY STAGES ....................................................................................... 378
IV. THE ECLIPSE OF PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE RENTIER STATE.. 381
V . THE ADVENT OF PUBLIC PET1TIONS ............................................................................................. 382
VI. THE 1990s REFORM: NEW FORM, OLD SUBSTANCE .................................................................... 384
VII. THE PRIMACY OF TRADITIONAL NORMS OF GOVERNANCE .......................................................... 389
VIII. 9/11 AND ITS AFTERMATH .................................................................................................. 392
IX . C ON CLU SION ................................................................................................................................ 395
Citizens shall pledge allegiance to the King on the basis of the Holy Quran and the
Tradition of His Messenger, and on the basis of submission and obedience, in times of
hardship and ease, fortune and adversity.'
The democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a suitable system for the
peoples of our region. Our peoples' makeup and unique qualities are different from those
of the rest of the world. We cannot import the methods used by people in other countries
and apply them to our people. We have our Islamic beliefs that constitute a complete and
fully-integrated system. Free elections are not within this Islamic system, which is based
on consultation (shura) and the openness between the ruler and his subjects before whom
he is fully responsible .... The system of free elections is not suitable to our country, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-a country that is unique in that it represents the Muslim
world in supervising the holy shrines, and unique in other ways as well as I have already
pointed out .... In my view, Western democracies may be suitable in their own countries
but they do not suit other countries.
2
t B.A., Michigan State University, 1979; M.A., Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies, 1980; J.D., Yale Law School, 1984. Mr. Al-Fahad is a practicing
attorney in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Yale Middle East
Legal Studies Seminar in New Haven, CT, January 28-30, 2005, and at the Sixth Mediterranean Social
and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schumann Centre for
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005.
1. BASIC LAW [Constitution] art. 6 (Saudi Arabia).
2. King Fahd, March 28, 1992. Quoted in Introduction, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EMPTY
REFORMS: SAUDI ARABIA'S NEW BASIC LAWS (May 1992), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/-
1992/saudi/ [hereinafter EMPTY REFORMS].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent wave of
democratization in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the 1990s, the Arab world
stands out as practically the only area where authoritarianism prevails.3 While
debates about the causes of this "democratic gap" and Arab or Muslim
"exceptionalism" are inconclusive, it is still the case that the Arab countries
rank low on any scale of the protection of political and human rights or
participatory politics. 4 Yet on the whole, the Arab countries boast impressive
constitutions that theoretically offer significant guarantees of those rights, that
declare freedoms inviolate, and that base governance on popular will through
periodic elections or plebiscites. The reality of these constitutions and polities
is, of course, different: provisions about rights are suspended; virtually
permanent states of emergency are declared; elections are either fraudulent or
uncontested, or both; and authoritarianism is left unhampered by these
theoretical safeguards. Even in so-called revolutionary republican regimes,
dynastic rule prevails, presidents remain in power for life, sons inherit the
presidency, and if constitutions become an impediment, they are hurriedly and
shamelessly amended. Viewed in that context, the Saudi constitution, or
Basic Law of Governance, stands out: it is unabashedly honest, promulgating
no rights that will not be protected, promising no elections, and not conceding
the principle of accountable governance in any direct way. Indeed, the Saudi
Basic Law signifies, if anything, a qualified rejection of many of the standard
notions of constitutionalism in terms of rights and freedoms, while ratifying a
powerful executive circumscribed only by historical practices and Islamic
ideas of governance.
II. A TRAIL OF PROMISES
The first mention of a basic law dates as far back as September 16, 1932,
when King Abd al-Aziz (r. 1902-1953), after a long and arduous process of
3. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's recent Index of Political Freedom covering the Arab
countries, Iran, and Israel, many of these states scored very low. Saudi Arabia lay at the bottom with a
score of 1.75 out of a possible 10. Press Release, Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia Is the Least
Free Country in the Middle East, at http://store.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=prstory&pressid=20000802
(Mar. 10, 2005).
4. The explanations range from the nature of Islam or certain interpretations thereof to the
phenomenon of the rentier state. See Adrian Karatnycky, The 2001 Freedom House Survey: Muslim
Countries and the Democracy Gap, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2002, at 99; Sanford Lakoff, The Reality of
Muslim Exceptionalism, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2004, at 133; Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?, 53 WORLD POLITICS 325 (2001); Alfred C. Stepan & Graeme B. Robertson, An "Arab"
More Than "Muslim " Electoral Gap, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2003, at 30; Alfred C. Stepan & Graeme B.
Robertson, Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2004, at 140. But cf Michael Herb,
No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy, 37 J. COMP. POL. 297
(2005) (adducing "ambivalent conclusion[s] concerning the [rentier state] theory").
5. When President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria died on June 10, 2000, his son Bashar succeeded
him as expected. The Syrian constitution, in Article 83, stipulated the minimum age of forty years for
the president, but when Bashar (then only thirty-four) failed to qualify, the constitution was duly
amended, and he predictably won the plebiscite. Saddam Hussein of Iraq was also apparently grooming
his sons to succeed him. Finally, it is widely believed that President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President
Ali Abdallah Salih of Yemen, and Colonel Muammar Qadhafi of Libya have more or less anointed their
sons to rule after they pass away (it is unlikely they would leave their positions alive).
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conquest and absorption, issued an order unifying the dual Kingdom of Hijaz
and Najd and its Dependencies under the new designation of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. This seminal decree aimed to assure the world and Saudi
citizens that the new Kingdom intended to partake fully of modem
governance, declaring that "[o]ur existing Council of Deputies 6 must
immediately start the drafting of a basic law of governance for the Kingdom, a
law of succession to the throne and a law for Iovemmental organization.,
7
This urgency must have dissipated fairly quickly, since no mention was made
of a basic law until the reign of Abd al-Aziz's successor, King Saud (r. 1953-
1964), when several pronouncements were made but no action taken. One
detailed announcement appeared in connection with the submission of then-
Crown Prince Faysal, in his capacity as prime minister, of his Ten Point
Program in 1962, but the matter went no further.9 Upon deposing King Saud
and assuming the throne himself in November 1964, Faysal went further and
appointed a committee to draft the promised basic law. Silence reigned until
King Khalid succeeded to the throne after Faysal's assassination in 1975, and
another promise was made of a basic law and a shura (consultative) council,
followed by another statement in 1980 of the formation of yet another
committee to draft the law. 10 When Fahd became king in 1982, he promised
that the law would be issued but none came into being. The sense of urgency,
however, returned in the midst of the Gulf crisis following Iraq's occupation
of Kuwait in 1990. Saturated with foreign troops, uncharacteristically exposed
to the world media fanning out all over the country, and faced with petitions
by various citizen groups demanding reforms, the Saudi leadership felt
compelled to announce that major changes were pending, including a new
shura council, a basic law of governance, and a new administrative law for the
provinces. Finally, on March 1, 1992, the long-promised Basic Law of
Governance, along with two other promised statutes, was promulgated.
In light of this rich history, one could be forgiven for harboring major
expectations for a document that was promised for nearly sixty years and that
sat in drafting committees for half that time. Such expectations, however,
proved to be unwarranted. The document did not usher in a new age of
6. The term Council of Deputies (Majis al-Wukala) is the early equivalent of the Council of
Ministers, apparently inherited from old Ottoman administrative nomenclature.
7. Royal Order no. 2716, reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 406, Sept. 23, 1932.
8. The old Shura (Consultative) Council submitted a 140-article draft, but nothing was heard
of it. See UMM AL-QURA, no. 610, Aug. 18, 1936. Whether the Council of Deputies offered its own draft
is not clear from the accessible public records.
9. In a speech in November 1962, Faysal declared:
[T]he government is of the opinion that the time has now come for the promulgation of a
fundamental law for the country, based on the Book of God [the Quran], the Shariah of
His Prophet and the life of His wise successors. The law clearly sets down the basic
principles of government and the relation between ruler and citizen, organizes the
different powers and authorities of the state and co-ordinates their relation to each other.
It also sets down the basic rights of the citizen including that of freedom of expression,
within the limits of the Islamic faith and public policy.
Quoted in GERALD DE GAURY, FAISAL, KING OF SAuDi ARABIA 153 (1966). On Faysal and his reform
plans, see generally id.
10. In an interview given by then-Crown Prince Fahd to a Kuwaiti newspaper, he stated that a
209-article basic law was ready. The law eventually adopted was less than half that length. See EcY
REFORMS, supra note 2, ch. 1.
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:347
constitutionalism, nor did it introduce meaningful changes or innovations in
the governance practices and structures of the Kingdom. Beyond the mere fact
of its promulgation, one was hard put to see much significance in this Law at
all. Indeed, if anything, the Basic Law is a prism through which to view the
regression in the philosophy and practice of Saudi governance over the same
period. While early state practices allowed for degrees of participatory
politics, accountability, and transparency, the Basic Law codifies 1 their more
or less total removal from the body politic. The backsliding of Saudi politics,
while regrettable in many respects, is fully understandable in historical terms,
with rent from oil allowing the state a degree of autonomy from society that
would have been unthinkable a few generations ago.
III. STATE-BUILDING: THE EARLY STAGES
The Saudi state dates back to the middle of the eighteenth century, when
an alliance among the settled communities of central Arabia, mobilized by a
religious reform movement later known as Wahhabism, launched campaigns
to unify the disparate and warring towns, regions, and tribes. The success of
the movement varied over time and space. Only with the rise of King Abd al-
Aziz and through his campaigns, from 1902 to 1930, was a state formed on a
stable footing-modern-day Saudi Arabia. 12  Traditional norms of
governance, 13 which put a premium on consensus, prevailed throughout this
time. Such norms were strongly influenced by the classical Islamic notions of
rule, according to which, inter alia, the religiously trained scholars and jurists
(the ulama) play a major role as grantors of legitimacy and act as a constraint
against despotism.
14
The first challenge to this historically workable formula came with King
Abd al-Aziz's 1925 conquest of the Hijaz, where Islam's holiest shrines are
11. In the speech the king gave upon promulgating the Basic Law, he stressed that the
Kingdom had never suffered from a "constitutional vacuum" since it had always possessed general
principles and rules that directed the working of the state and its rulers, judges, and functionaries. Thus,
the Basic Law was simply a "codification" (tawthiq) of existing conditions and practices. See UMM AL-
QURA, no. 69, Mar. 6, 1992.
12. For a short history of the rise of the Saudi and Wahhabi movement, see Abdulaziz H. Al-
Fahad, The 'Imamah vs. the 'Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Sa 'udi State, in
COUNTER-NARRATIVES: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, AND POLmCS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND
YEMEN 35 (Madawi AI-Rasheed & Robert Vitalis eds., 2003).
13. Among the traditional institutions of governance is the open audience through which,
theoretically, any citizen could petition directly the king and his subordinates. On the role of the open
audience, see FAISAL BIN MISHA'AL BIN SA'UD AL-SA'UD, THE "OPEN COUNCILS" AND THE ISLAMIC
CONCEPT OF RULE IN SAUDI ARABIAN POLITICS ch. 6 (2003).
14. For a historical review of Sunni constitutional theory and practice, see H.A.R. Gibb,
Constitutional Organization, in I LAW IN TIE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC
LAW 3 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955). On the juristic theory of government see
ANN K.S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY: THE JURISTS (1981). For a recent and more elaborate study, see
PATRICIA CRONE, GOD'S RULE: GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM (2004). On the relationship between the ulama
and the political leadership in classical Islam, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW 178 (2005). The author is grateful to Professor Hallaq for sharing a draft copy of this work
prior to its publication. For a study of the role of the ulama in modem times, including references to
Saudi ulama, see MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF
CHANGE (2002).
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located. That region had been part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries and
boasted a relatively sophisticated, cosmopolitan, urban population that was
familiar with modem methods of governance and had enjoyed independence
for the prior decade, during which it had begun forming its own modem
structures of governance.15 The traditional forms of rule common in other
parts of the new state proved inadequate for this more worldly and exposed
region. The problem of governance in the Hijaz was further compounded by
the intense interest and competition evinced by other major Muslim powers,
such as Egypt and the Indian Muslim communities. Demands for the
internationalization of the Islamic holy places were articulated but were
ultimately defeated by the deft political skills of Abd al-Aziz. To assure the
Muslim communities of his qualifications to govern the holy territory, and to
persuade the larger world to ratify his exploits and recognize the young state,
the king embarked on a fast-paced program to create modem state structures
and laws. For some time, such structures and laws were applied only in the
Hijaz, which was designated as a viceroyalty with Abd al-Aziz's second-
eldest son, Faysal, as viceroy. Abd al-Aziz continued to govern the rest of the
country according to time-honored practices whereby complex but informal
political structures were maintained.
Shortly after he assumed total control of the territory, Abd al-Aziz was
proclaimed King of the Hijaz, 16 adding this title to his existing position as
Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. To consolidate Saudi rule in the Hijaz,
the king convened a constituent assembly (hayah tasisiyyah)17 of influential
inhabitants of the region, some of whom were chosen by secret ballot, which
approved a Hijazi constitution on September 3, 1926 (formally known as the
Organic Instructions of the Hijazi Kingdom). While declaring the Hijaz to be
a "consultative, Islamic State,"19 the constitution did not overplay its Islamic
identity as later documents would. Further, it allowed for no distinction
between legislative and executive functions and did not include references to
15. For a history of that period, see generally JOSHUA TEITELBAUM, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF ARABIA (2001).
16. UMM AL-QURA, no. 55, Jan. 15, 1926.
17. The king ordered the formation of a constituent assembly (hayah tasisiyyah) composed of
Hijazi citizens to determine the name of the chief of the government of the Hijaz, the nature of its
relations with Najd, the form of government, the international posture of the region, and the Hijazi flag
and currency. The assembly consisted of fifty-one members from all over the Hjiaz who eventually
recommended the proclamation of Abd al-Aziz as King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its
Dependencies.
18. For the original Arabic text, see UMM AL-QURA, no. 90, Sept. 3, 1926. A review of the
early issues of this Saudi official gazette, first published in November 1924, reveals the impressive array
of decisions taken in the first two years to facilitate the consolidation of Saudi rule. Thus Umm al-Qura
reports that the sultan called for the election of a shura council from among the merchants, ulama, and
notables of Makkah, stressing that such a council must be "real and not fictional," and further called for
the formation of a national council (maflis ahli) to look into the affairs of the city. UMM AL-QURA, no. 3,
Dec. 12, 1924. Elections were duly held in the sultan's palace, and fourteen National Council members
were chosen. The National Council was dissolved in the summer of 1925 and a new one elected, with
one representative from each neighborhood, one representative for the merchants, one for the ulama, and
three from among the ashraf, the ruling group that had governed before the Saudi conquest. The
functions of the council were also published. UMM AL-QURA, no. 31, Aug. 1, 1925; UMM AL-QURA, no.
32, Aug. 8, 1925.
19. Although some translate this phrase, dawlah malakiyyah islamiyah shurzyyah, as
"constitutional Muslim monarchy," a more accurate rendering would be "consultative Islamic State."
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elections. Yet this constitution and its ancillary institutions permitted a
modicum of accountable and participatory governance.
Most important of such institutions were the old Shura Council2° and the
Council of Deputies, 21 which collectively held relatively strong powers over
decisions of state policy and the budget. Although the old Shura Council was
appointed and the king could dissolve it or change its membership at any time,
the government was still required to submit the budget, planned public
ventures, new laws, concessions, and government contracts to the Council.
Similarly, the heads of government agencies were obligated to attend the old
Council's sessions when matters related to their activities were under
discussion. The Council of Deputies met for twenty years until its functions
were taken over in 1953 by a less powerful Council of Ministers, 22 which
eclipsed the old Shura Council. The old Shura Council remained dormant
until the formation of the new Shura Council in 1993, which enjoyed fewer
powers than the former.
Equally significant, municipal elections were regularly held in the major
towns of the Hijaz between 1926 and 1963.23 As part of Faysal's 1962 reform
program, such elections were held in other towns, including the capital city
Riyadh. In 1963, after voters cast their ballots, the results were annulled and a
revision of the laws was announced, to be enacted fourteen years later in
241977. Repealing the earlier laws of 1939 and 1942, the 1977 Municipalities
and Village Law, promulgated by Royal Decree M/5 dated February 10, 1977,
strengthened the role of the central government in municipal affairs but
permitted the election of half the members of each municipal council (the
other half to be appointed by the minister of municipal affairs). Coming at the
height of the oil boom, with citizens enjoying inexorable improvement in their
quality of life, this law proved to be superfluous and no elections were
discussed, let alone held.25
This trend toward democratic backslide could also be observed at the
level of provincial administration. The 1940 Law of Administrative Councils
contained elaborate provisions concerning the powers of the 2provincial
administrative councils and mandated elections in each province. This law
20. See ORGANIC INSTRUCTIONS [Constitution, 1926] arts. 28-31, 36 (Saudi Arabia), cited in
UMM AL-QURA, no. 90, supra note 18. Appointments and amendments were made on several occasions.
See, e.g., UMM AL-QURA, no. 135, July 15, 1927; UMM AL-QURA, no. 186, July 13, 1928.
21. SeeUMMAL-QURA, no. 370, Jan. 15, 1932.
22. For a study of the early stages of the Council of Ministers, see Charles W. Harrington, The
Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers, 117 MIDDLE E. J. 1 (1958); SUMMER SCOTT HUYETTE, POLITICAL
ADAPTATION IN SA'uDI ARABIA, A STUDY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (1985).
23. See, e.g., UMM AL-QURA, no. 47, Nov. 20, 1925 (Municipal Elections Regulations); UMM
AL-QURA, no. 727, Nov. 11, 1938 (Law of the Capital's Municipality and Municipalities of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia).
24. See EMPTY REFORMS, supra note 2, ch. 3.
25. Only in 2004 was the law applied, and implementing regulations adopted, authorizing the
recent municipal elections.
26. Apparently not published in the official gazette, the Governors and Administrative
Councils Law is available in the government archives of the Public Administration Institute in Riyadh.
In Chapter Two, the law establishes administrative councils, authorizes the election of their members,
and enumerates their powers. It stipulates that elections are to be held every two years; that the size of
each council should vary according to the size of each province, ranging from four to eight members;
and that the chair of the council should be the appointed governor. Governors and Administrative
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was later superseded by a 1963 statute that eliminated elections and provided
that all members be appointed by the king, a norm sanctioned by the Law of
Provinces of 1992.27
IV. THE ECLIPSE OF PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF
THE RENTIER STATE
Between 1932 and 1992, Saudi society and government were
transformed beyond recognition. In the early years of the modern Saudi state,
most of the national income had come from customs duties and fees collected
from Muslim pilgrims flocking to the holy places in the Hijaz, a modest
income by any standards but considerably more substantial than the traditional
zakat (religious tax) collected by the state in the rest of the country. With the
signing of a concession agreement with the Standard Oil Company of
California in 1933, the old sources of income were soon eclipsed by oil
revenue. 28 As the state received successively higher oil rents, the Saudi
governing elite was slowly freed from the typical constraints faced by other
ruling groups, which had to resort to the citizenry to collect taxes and fees for
financing government functions. Indeed, the state became the major
benefactor in society through the distribution of oil largesse. With such radical
economic transformation, embryonic participatory and accountable
governance was gradually abandoned, and a powerful state apparatus
managed to rule the country without much need to consult with the populace
or worry about accountability.
With respect to modem methods and structures of governance, and until
the reforms of the 1990s, the pressures faced by the Saudi state derived from
its external relations rather than from domestic demands. Thus the first Hijaz
constitution was promulgated to secure the Saudi position against other
Muslim claimants of the holy sites. The call in the unification decree of 1932
for the drafting of a basic law of governance was dictated by the need for
international recognition. Similarly, the struggle with Egyptian President
Jamal Abdel Nasser and the threats posed by zpan-Arabism in the 1950s and
1960s forced several changes on the Saudis,2 culminating in the deposal of
King Saud and his replacement with King Faysal.
As a result of these struggles, various efforts at reform were made,
mostly to placate the outside world. The most serious effort at constitutional
reform took the form of a radical, 200-article draft basic law prepared under
the auspices of one of Faysal's brothers, Prince Talal, which came close to
Councils Law, ch. 2, arts. 29, 34 (1940) (Saudi Arabia). These councils had wide powers over a range of
fiscal and administrative issues, including budgetary items, contracts, licenses, complaints against
bureaucrats, welfare projects, and disputes among inhabitants (not subject to the courts' jurisdiction). Id.
arts. 35-50.
27. EMPTY REFORMS, supra note 2. For the text of the 1963 law, see UMM AL-QURA, no. 1992,
Oct. 18, 1963.
28. Oil was found in commercial quantities in 1938, but the country achieved substantial
exports only after World War II.
29. For a brief history of the inter-Arab conflicts of that era, see MALCOLM KERR, THE ARAB
COLD WAR (2d ed. 1967).
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adoption in 1961.30 In this draft, the authority of the king was clearly
circumscribed by an empowered national assembly, two-thirds of whose
members were to be elected. In addition, the draft required transparency in
public finance and permitted the assembly to take no-confidence votes and
compel the resignation of ministers, including the prime minister. Other
innovations included a clear division among the executive, legislative, and
judicial authorities and the establishment of a council of state to adjudicate
constitutional disputes. Private and public rights were also elaborated, with the
draft reflecting the tenor of the times by exhibiting some clearly discemable
socialist tendencies. The radicalism of this draft basic law was demonstrated
by the prince's suggestion that even the name of the country should be
changed from that of the ruling dynasty.31
Prince Talal's constitution was decisively defeated by the ruling elite.
32King Faysal triumphed in his struggle with King Saud. Yet King Faysal
himself could not avoid coming up with his own alternative proposals, first in
his acknowledgment of the need for a new constitutional framework when he
assumed the premiership in 1962, and later when he formed a drafting
committee upon acceding to the throne in 1964. After radical pan-Arabism
was curtailed with the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the intra-family
rift had healed, and the country was back on sound financial footing, little
need was felt even to discuss constitutional changes publicly. A fleeting
reference to the need for a new basic law was ritually made when King Khalid
succeeded to the throne in 1975. In a country dizzy with the proceeds of the
oil boom, however, such reference attracted little attention.
V. THE ADVENT OF PUBLIC PETITIONS
It was once again foreign events, this time coupled with serious
domestic disturbances, that thrust the issue of constitutional reform to the fore.
In early 1979 the Iranian revolution took place, its leaders espousing a radical
Islamist and anti-monarchical stance. Following the revolution in Iran came
an attack on the Holy Mosque in Mecca later that year by a large group of
disgruntled fundamentalists. These two events led to the 1980 announcement
that a 209-article draft basic law was ready for promulgation.
33
Unsurprisingly, this promise proved to be hollow. Yet another pledge was
made when King Fahd succeeded to the throne in 1982 at the height of the
Iran-Iraq war.
In contrast with past experiences, the 1990 declaration about imminent
constitutional reforms found its genesis mostly in domestic pressures. The
Saudi ruling elite was treading on unfamiliar territory, with some 700,000
foreign troops stationed in the country to protect it against Iraq and to prepare
30. The draft basic law, with an explanatory introduction and a law of provinces, was
published by Prince Talal as Risalah ila Muwatin [Letter to a Citizen].
31. Id.
32. For a study of the intra-family disputes during that period, see SARAH YIZRAELI, THE
REMAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN KING SA'UD AND CROWN PRINCE FAYSAL
(1997).
33. EMPTY REFORMS, supra note 2, ch. 1.
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for the liberation of Kuwait. The looming danger in the north and the foreign
presence, which included a large contingent of international reporters freely
roaming the country, created a combustible mix that duly translated into major
demands for all kinds of reform. Some activist women seized on the presence
of the foreign media and demonstrated publicly by driving cars, 34 flouting the
informal ban (and eliciting a formal one) and raising the ire of
fundamentalists, who expressed their rage using all fora available to them, not
least the mosques. Into that mix came two petitions presented to the king,
which were quickly leaked to foreign publications. Both contained demands
for major reform.
The pressure of those hectic events forced the ruling elite to articulate
promises in order to placate elite and popular demands. Accordingly, on
November 8, 1990, the king promised a new shura council appointed from
among capable citizens.36 On the heels of this promise, a group of forty-three
public figures, including ex-cabinet ministers, journalists, businessmen, and
academics re resenting both religious and liberal trends, submitted a petition
to the king. It implored the king to introduce many changes, the most
important of which were the promulgation of a basic law and the
establishment of a new shura council. The religious elite was alarmed by this
liberal petition and, not to be outdone, weighed in two months later with its
own petition, signed by more than 200 citizens, including scores of top
religious authorities as well as the grand mufti.
Starting with the recognition of the need for change in order to check the
deterioration in the country's political and social environment, the signatories
then adumbrated their proposals for reform, stressing the need for a new shura
council and for the comprehensive Islamization of state policies, the civil
service, and the laws. 38 Government displeasure with the publication of this
34. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, An Outcry from the Saudis' Liberal Minority, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1990, at A15.
35. Populist measures undertaken during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis included partial
forgiveness of governmental home loans, UMM AL-QURA, no. 3340, Jan. 11, 1991, and lower prices for
gasoline, electricity, water, telephone, expatriate worker visas, and ports and commercial registrations
for businesses, UMM AL-QuRA, no. 3400, Mar. 27, 1992.
36. Up until the formation of the new council, the old Shura Council was still technically in
existence, but its membership was inactive and was literally dying out.
37. The signatories made the following demands: (1) A review of the monopolistic system
under whichfatwas are rendered should be instituted, and more open debate allowing for more pluralism
in views should be encouraged. (2) The repeated statements issued by the government should be
honored, and a basic law of governance promulgated. (3) A consultative council should be formed,
composed of qualified and knowledgeable opinion-makers representing all regions of the Kingdom. The
council must have among its responsibilities the study, development, and adoption of laws and rules
related to all economic, political, educational, and other issues, and it should exercise effective scrutiny
of all executive agencies. (4) Municipal councils should be revived; the Law of Provinces should be
implemented; and the chamber of commerce experience should be generalized as a model for all other
trades. (5) The judicial system should be reformed to ensure the competence of judges and their
independence, and it should be open to all qualified citizens. (6) There should be a commitment to total
equality among all citizens in all aspects of their lives, without distinction based on ethnic, tribal,
sectarian, or social origins. The principle of protecting citizens against interference in their lives without
a court order must be firmly established. (7) The media must be reformed. (8) Comprehensive reform of
the religious police should be introduced, and their arbitrary powers should be curbed. (9) Finally,
reforms related to the status of women and education should be undertaken.
38. The petition called for the following specific reforms: (1) A consultative council to decide
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petition caused the Council of Senior Ulama (chaired by the grand mufti
himself) to issue a condemnation at the request of the political authorities, but
its criticism addressed the act of publication, not the substance of the petition,
since Sunni traditions hold that counsel to the ruler should be offered in
private only.
39
VI. THE 1990s REFORM: NEW FORM, OLD SUBSTANCE
Immediately after the liberation of Kuwait and the departure of most
foreign troops, the king issued three royal orders on March 1, 1992,
promulgating a package of the promised reforms: a Basic Law of Governance,
a Shura Council Law, and a Law of Provinces. The Basic Law, touted as a
foundational document for the governance of Saudi Arabia, is unique in many
respects. It was drafted in secrecy, and the names of the members of the
drafting committee were not released until after its enactment.40 There was no
public debate, nor was there the usual Saudi private consultation within
various governmental agencies. Declaring that the true constitution of the
country was the "the Book of God [the Quran] and the Tradition of His
internal and external issues on the basis of shariah should be formed. Its members must be honest and
represent all fields of expertise. They must be totally independent and not subject to any pressure that
may affect the authority of the council. (2) All laws and regulations of political, economic,
administrative, or other nature must be reconciled with the principles of shariah. Trusted committees
with expertise in the shariah should be authorized to repeal non-conforming legislation. (3) The
selection of government officials and overseas representatives must be based not just on expertise but
also on exemplary Islamic morality. (4) Equality must be ensured for all citizens, not favoring the nobles
or disfavoring the weak, and abuse of power must be stopped. (5) High officials must be held
accountable and the corrupt removed regardless of other considerations. (6) Public wealth must be
distributed fairly among all classes and groups, taxes eliminated, and burdensome fees reduced.
Government revenue must be protected from exploitation and abuse; all forms of monopoly or
illegitimate ownership eliminated; restrictions on Islamic banks lifted; and public and private banking
institutions cleansed of usury. (7) The army must be strengthened and fully integrated, and weapon
sources must be diversified. (8) The media must be remodeled to educate, serve Islam, and express the
morals of society. (9) Foreign policy must be based on the national interest without relying on alliances
not sanctioned by shariah. (10) Religious and proselytizing institutions must be developed and
strengthened with financial and human resources. (11) The judiciary must be unified and granted full
and effective independence. Its authority must be applied to all, and effective methods must be devised
to execute judgments. (12) Finally, the rights of individuals and society must be guaranteed. Every
restriction on people's rights must be removed to ensure the enjoyment of human dignity within
acceptable religious safeguards. Significantly, the petition does not refer to a basic law at all.
39. The statement made by the Council of Senior Ulama, the highest religious body in the
country, was published in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3360, June 7, 1991. This statement is a study in traditional
Sunni terms on the proper manner of proffering advice to the community and to wali al-amr, the
political leadership. In the preamble, the jurists recapitulate the importance of mutual advice and cite
textual support from the sayings of the Prophet. They also cite the correct rules for offering advice
where it would work as a corrective of errant ways and help to attain the good of the community, as well
as warn against giving advice that may cause dissention or that overlooks positive aspects and deals
exclusively with the negatives. As to providing advice specifically to the rulers, the statement declares
that such advice must be given confidentially. Reminding the community of the blessings of security and
unity, and after reviewing media reports about "writings to the ruler" with respect to matters the writers
hoped "would be implemented," the council proclaimed its condemnation of the "manner followed in
publishing and disseminating what was written" and warned against the repetition of such activity. The
substance of the petition was never mentioned.
40. For a list of the names and positions of the committee's members, see Rahshed Aba-
Namay, Constitutional Reform: A Systemization of Saudi Politics, J. S. ASIAN & MIDDLE E. STUD.,
Spring 1993, at 53 n.14.
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Prophet,",4 1 the Basic Law made no allowance for popular sovereignty as a
foundation of its authority. No popular ratification was therefore needed by
way of a constituent assembly representing the people or a direct vote. Like
some early European constitutions (for example, that of Prussia), the Saudi
document was derived from the goodwill of the sovereign, whose powers
were in no way thereby diminished, and promulgated by means of a royal
order, which was also the instrument to modify the Basic Law. The only
constraints on executive power remained those of traditional norms and
Islamic precepts, which are external to the Basic Law.
The codification of the status quo of essentially unbridled executive
power is reflected throughout the Basic Law. Thus, after acknowledging the
usual division (separation would be an overstatement) of power into
executive, legislative, and judicial authorities, Article 44 concludes by
declaring the king to be "their final authority., 42 The king also appoints and
relieves judges of their offices upon recommendation of the Supreme Judicial
Council. He is to run the affairs of state in accordance with the dictates of
Islam, supervise the application of shariah43 and the general policies of the
state, and see to the state's protection and defense (Article 55). The king is the
president of the Council of Ministers and appoints his deputies, as well as all
ministers and high-ranking civil servants, by royal order (Articles 56 & 57).
He is the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, appoints and dismisses
officers (Article 60), and declares emergencies, mobilization, and war (Article
61). He is empowered to take urgent measures that he deems necessary to
safeguard the Kingdom and its territorial integrity and interests (Article 62).
He accepts the accreditation of foreign envoys, appoints ambassadors (Article
63), and bestows medals (Article 64). He may delegate some of his authority
to the crown prince (Article 65) and appoint a viceroy when he leaves the
Kingdom (Article 66).
Another significant theme permeating the Basic Law is the emphasis on
the country's Islamic identity, with references to Islam and shariah suffusing
the document. Such references range from the pure declaration of identity,
such as the affirmation that the state is Arab and Islamic in Article 1, to the
designation of the two annual Islamic feasts ('id al-fitr and 'id al-adha) as
official holidays and the Islamic lunar calendar as the official calendar
(Article 2).44 Invocation of traditional Islamic political themes can be found in
41. BASIC LAW [Constitution] art. I (Saudi Arabia). Libya, in a constitutional declaration in
1977, also proclaimed the Quran, but not the Traditions (Sunnah) of the Prophet, to be the constitution
of the country. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD 86 (2002).
42. Therefore, a constitutional court is not necessary, and the Basic Law provides for none.
43. Shariah (shari'ah) is the totality of God's commands as revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad and contained in the Islamic scriptures, the Quran and the Sunnah-the standard of
exemplary behavior of the Prophet as recorded in narrative reports, or hadith. Fiqh is the scholarly
product of deduction of positive law from these sources to determine the proper legal rules governing
ritual and worldly affairs. Fiqh covers both substantive law and legal methodology (usul al-fiqh, literally
"foundations offiqh'). Somewhat separate from fqh, but part of shariah, is theology, or 'aqidah. See
Abdulaziz H. A1-Fahad, From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of
Wahhabism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 485, 486 n.2 (2004) (discussing and defining these concepts). For a
primer in Islamic law, see generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-FiQH (1997).
44. Suggestions that such references in the Basic Law are "an exercise in triviality," Ann
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the manner in which the king receives allegiance upon assuming the throne
(Article 6). The state also protects the Islamic creed and applies shariah,
maintains the holy shrines and facilitates the annual pilgrimage, and strives to
realize the aspirations of solidarity among Arab and Islamic nations (Articles
23-25). More significantly, the Basic Law establishes Islam, and shariah
specifically, as the only substantial constraint on executive power, duly
declaring at the outset that the constitution of the state is the Quran and the
Prophet's Tradition. Article 7 affirms that "governance . . . derives its
authority from the [Quran and Tradition] of the Prophet, both of which govern
this Law and all the laws of the State."'5 Shariah also governs the notions of
justice, consultation, and equality in governance (Article 8). The Basic Law
acknowledges the sacrosanct nature of shariah, and when it provides that the
king may suspend the Basic Law, it specifically subordinates this power to the
Islamic authority granted in Article 7.
In addition to providing general constraints on government, shariah
operates as the legal system of the country. Accordingly, statutory laws are
subordinated to Islamic law. Thus the concept of legislative authority is highly
attenuated, and even the language employed avoids the term commonly used
in Arabic for legislation, tashri', a cognate of shariah; resort is instead made
to the less offensive expression nizam, or regulations. While the king is
empowered to issue new laws (with or without the non-binding input of the
Shura Council), judges are enjoined to apply shariah and only those statutes
not inconsistent with it (Article 48). The traditional shariah courts are given
comprehensive jurisdiction over all civil and criminal disputes (Article 49),
subject to the limited authority of the Board of Grievances, which is
Elizabeth Mayer, Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in an Era of Transition, 1
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 183, 192 (2002), are mistaken. Holidays and the calendar are sensitive
issues, as the ulama uphold the Islamic injunction that only these two feasts are legitimate holidays in
Islam. Moreover, they take exception to using the Christian (i.e., Gregorian) solar year instead of the
Islamic Hijri lunar year. Because of the unpredictability of exact dates in the lunar calendar, early on
King Abd al-Aziz had resort to the traditional solar (zodiac) year and designated the first day of
Capricorn (January 8) as a national day celebrating his ascent to the throne. This celebration lasted only
for a couple of years and was confined to the Hijaz. FUAD HAMZAH, AL-BILAD AL-ARABIYYAH AL-
SAUDTYYAH [THE SAUDI ARAB NATIoN] 154 (1968). Since the famous unification decree, which
specified the first day of Libra as the national holiday, the political leadership has been trying to have
the country celebrate the holiday but has been frustrated by the ulama's objections. Despite its being
referred to as a holiday in the Labor and Workmen Law (Article 155 gives the minister of labor and
social affairs the power to determine these holidays, which he designated in his Ministerial Resolution
no. 812, dated November 30, 1974, to include the national holiday), in reality it is not viewed as such
and is generally not enforced by the labor courts. The same may be said about the fiscal year. Seeking to
rationalize the annual budget, the best the leadership could do was to continue to use the zodiac year's
equivalent of the Gregorian calendar, but it was always careful to announce the budget on a date other
than January 1.
45. The references to the "Quran and the Sunnah [Traditions] of His Prophet" represent a
clear indication that Sunni Islam is the authoritative religious order. There are no provisions allowing for
the formal equality of the other sects that exist in Saudi Arabia, including substantial minorities of two
Shiite groups (the Imamiyyah, or Twelvers, in the Eastern Province and in Madinah, and the Ismailis in
Najran on the border with Yemen). In this respect, the Saudi Basic Law is unique among Arab
constitutions. Even when the Iranian constitution establishes Imami Shiism as the official religion, it
grants some theoretical rights to other minorities, including the Sunni community in Iran (Article 12).
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empowered to apply most of the new statutory laws that the shariah courts
frequently view as non-binding (Article 53).46
With respect to modem notions of rights, the Basic Law exhibits two
different attitudes. While generally protective of rights in the private and
economic spheres, it is decidedly parsimonious with public rights. The Basic
Law appears to guarantee a decent livelihood to all citizens and facilitate
employment (Articles 27-28); encourage science, culture, and research
(Article 29); make education and health services available, presumably free of
charge (Articles 30 & 31); and protect the environment (Article 32). Homes
are held inviolable (Article 37); criminal statutes may not be applied
retroactively (Article 38); privacy of communications is protected (Article
40); and private property is inviolate (Article 18). In the public sphere,
however, the Basic Law fails to provide for the panoply of rights to which
most constitutions would at least pay lip service. While acknowledging the
concept of the protection of human rights, this protection is limited to such
rights as are consistent with shariah notions (Article 26). Moreover, freedoms
of religion and assembly are completely absent,4 while freedom of expression
is greatly circumscribed (Article 39.8Y Absent also is the right of association,
not surprising in a country that bans political parties, trade unions, and
demonstrations and which generally views civic organizations with•• 49
suspicion.
46. The reluctance of shariah judges to apply modem statutory laws forced the government
over the years to set up special tribunals to adjudicate many areas of law, including negotiable
instruments, customs, boycotts, labor, and trademarks. The instrument promulgating the Basic Law took
care to allow for all pre-existing laws inconsistent with the Basic Law to remain valid until they are
brought into conformity. Yet when recent laws were promulgated, new judicial tribunals were set up in
derogation of the jurisdiction of the shariah courts as affirmed in Article 49, a clear violation of the
Basic Law. Most significant among the new tribunals are two relating to capital markets and to the
press. See Law of Printed Matters and Publication, art. 37, reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3825, Dec.
23, 2000 (stipulating the formation and jurisdiction of the tribunal); Capital Market Law, art. 25,
reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3965, Aug. 29, 2003 (stipulating the formation of a tribunal and an
appellate court to adjudicate disputes stemming from the Capital Market Law). For a study of the
evolution of statutory law and its relationship with shariah, see Ahron Layish, Saudi Arabian Legal
Reform as a Mechanism to Moderate Wahabf Doctrine, 107 J. AM. ORIENTAL Soc'Y 279 (1987). For the
general question of the future of shariah in Islamic countries, see Ahron Layish, The Transformation of
Shari'a from Jurists' Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim World, 44 DIE WELT DE
ISLAMS 85 (2004).
47. While freedom of assembly is mostly a policy question subject to the control of the
political leaders, freedom of religion is a very sensitive issue in Saudi Arabia. Even if politicians had the
will to relax it, doing so would damage their own legitimacy in the eyes of a society still intolerant of
this notion.
48. Freedom of expression is constrained by political as well as religious considerations.
Recently, some writers have been sued by private citizens in shariah courts for allegedly violating
shariah. The complaints have been referred to the press tribunal set up under the Law of Printed Matters
and Publications promulgated on November 29, 2000, see supra note 46. In a recent controversy about
jurisdiction over printed matter violations, the crown prince "nullified" a judgment by a shariah court
against a university professor sued by one of his colleagues for mocking his conservative appearance.
The decision again restricts jurisdiction over such matters to the press tribunal set up under the Law of
Printed Matters and Publications and administered by the ministry of information and culture. Raid
Qusti, Crown Prince Quashes Jail Term of Saudi Writer, ARAB NEWS, http://www.arabnews.com/-
?page=l&section=0&article=60829&d=22&m=3&y-2005 (Mar. 22, 2005).
49. An odd provision in the Basic Law is the rejection of the non-refoulement principle of
asylum law, considered part of customary international law. Grant of political asylum is determined by
consideration of Saudi "public interest" rather than the need of the asylum seeker (Article 42). See A.
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While the Basic Law concedes a right to participatory governance, this
right is restricted to the traditional notions enshrined in shariah; thus the basis
of shura, or consultation, for governance is so qualified in Article 8. It is
further reiterated in Article 67, which empowers the "regulatory authority"
(the royally appointed Shura Council) to draft laws and regulations in the
public interest in accordance with Islamic rules. Legislation adopted by the
Council is conceived as mere advice that the sovereign is at liberty to accept
or disregard. Indeed, according to the Shura Council Law, legislation is to be
forwarded to the president of the Council of Ministers and not to the king,
further devaluing the Shura Council's status as a legislative body.50 Needless
to say, the Council has no authority to view, let alone debate, the state
budget. 51
Finally, the Basic Law fails to introduce any meaningful changes to the
law of succession in Saudi Arabia. True, the Basic Law for the first time
formally declares that succession is restricted to the male descendants of the
late King Abd al-Aziz to the exclusion of the collateral branches of the royal
family. It further codifies the power of the King to choose and relieve his heir
apparent (Article 5). Even this power, while theoretically more efficient, is
still problematic as a practical matter.52 Moreover, the declaration that the
"most suitable" or "fittest" among the descendants of the late King Abd al-
Aziz are eligible to be king is not an innovation and is consistent with past
Michael Tarazi, Recent Developments, Saudi Arabia 's New Basic Laws: The Struggle for Participatory
Islamic Government, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 258 (1993).
50. The constitutional arrangement is somewhat complicated. Article 17 of the Shura Council
Law, promulgated on March 1, 1992, originally stated:
Shura Council resolutions shall be referred to the President of the Council of Ministers
who shall refer them to the Council of Ministers for consideration. If the views of both
councils concur, the resolutions shall come into force following the King's approval. If
the views are at variance, the King may decide whatever he deems appropriate.
This text was amended on November 26, 2003, to read:
Shura Council resolutions shall be referred to the King who shall determine what of
which shall be referred to the Council of Ministers. If the views of the Shura Council and
the Council of Ministers are identical, the resolutions shall be promulgated upon approval
of the king. If the views of the two councils diverge, the matter shall be referred back to
the Shura Council to take the appropriate action and then submit it to the King for action
as he sees fit.
It should be noted that under both Article 6 of the Basic Law and Article 1 of the Law of the Council of
Ministers, the king is also the president of the Council of Ministers, the resolutions of which become
final only after the king's approval. There can be no conflict unless the king approves a resolution of the
Council of Ministers that is inconsistent with another adopted by the Shura Council.
51. Article 15 of the Shura Council Law explicitly states four duties of the Council: (1) to
"discuss the general plan of economic and social development"; (2) to "study international laws,
charters, treaties and agreements"; (3) to "interpret laws"; and (4) to "discuss annual reports submitted
by ministries and other government bodies, and make appropriate suggestions regarding them."
52. Historically, appointments to the heir apparent position were effected as follows: King
Abd al-Aziz proposed his eldest son, Saud, as crown prince, and the Council of Deputies and the Shura
Council ratified his decision, pledging allegiance to Saud. On the same day that Saud acceded to the
throne, he nominated his younger brother, Faysal, to be his heir apparent, an act sanctioned by the royal
family. Khalid's appointment as crown prince took place several months after Faysal's accession and
was effected through a statement by the king that he had chosen Khalid to be king after him. See UMM
AL-QURA, no. 2065, Apr. 2, 1965. When Faysal was killed and Khalid became king, he simultaneously
nominated Prince Fahd to be heir apparent. After receiving homage as king upon the death of Khalid,
Fahd simultaneously nominated Abd Allah to be his successor.
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practices: the age of the sons of King Abd al-Aziz was not previously
53
accepted as the sole determinant for succession.
In early Saudi history, the Wahhabi movement introduced agnatic
primogeniture-a revolutionary concept by local standards. Going against a
tradition of succession that effected rule through regicide more often than not,
the founder of Wahhabism nominated the eldest son of the Saudi ruler of his
time, a convention that survived remarkably intact through most of the
turbulent history of the Saudi dynasty. Even King Abd al-Aziz blocked the
attempts of his older nephew to succeed him and appointed his eldest
surviving son Saud as crown prince.5 4 Only with the conflict that ensued
between Saud and Faysal and the subsequent deposal of the former did the
concept of primogeniture disappear without any clear mechanism to replace it.
Although in his famous unification edict King Abd al-Aziz ordered the
drafting of a succession law, none has been written-a failure reflected in the
Basic Law.
55
VII. THE PRIMACY OF TRADITIONAL NORMS OF GOVERNANCE
Such a weak basic law still has one fundamental strength-honesty.
While laying some claims to being a foundational document, it is a royal edict
that does not pretend to be aspirational, an expression of the national will, a
basis for any newly recognized rights, or the beacon of a new constitutionalist
age. It does not even resolve the intra-elite issue of a functional succession
mechanism. The Basic Law merely codifies the authority of an all-powerful
executive and reiterates a strong Islamic identity, all the while remaining
faithful to established ideas and practices relating to governance and carefully
avoiding norms that the population would not accept such as freedom of belief
and gender equality. It is relatively rich in its designs of state organs, but it
skirts accountability, participatory politics, and transparency. Yet its
unqualified acknowledgment of the supremacy of Islamic norms does impose
meaningful constraints and checks on executive power.
56
53. Khalid (r. 1975-1982) was appointed crown prince and acceded to the throne while his
elder brother Muhammad was alive. Fahd assumed his positions of crown prince and king during the
lifetimes of his older siblings.
54. For the full story of royal succession in Saudi Arabia, see ALEXANDER BLIGH, FROM
PRINCE TO KING: ROYAL SUCCESSION IN THE HOUSE OF SAUD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1984).
55. The Saudi succession system is nonetheless able to avoid any crisis at the time of the
king's death by designating the next crown prince nominee in advance, before the king's death and the
accession of the existing heir apparent. Ever since King Faysal assumed the throne, the crown prince has
been designated deputy president of the Council of Ministers, with the prospective crown prince as
second deputy president.
56. These constraints have practical and sometimes profound implications. For example,
holding to the view that bank interest is a form of prohibited usury, the judiciary would void most
banking transactions, forcing the state to set up a special tribunal to adjudicate banking disputes. Even
such a tribunal would not compel payment of interest; the most it would do is decline to recharacterize
past interest payments as repayment of principal. The same dilemma long obtained with respect to the
insurance industry. Some agencies were allowed to offer services but could not have recourse to courts,
which viewed such contracts as void due to uncertainty. Only recently was a compromise reached that
would legalize insurance of the mutual type. It remains to be seen if the courts will validate such
insurance.
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First, the Basic Law treats the king neither as a sacrosanct figure nor as
an interpreter of Islam. While other Arab monarchical constitutions attribute
semi-divine qualities to the person of the king, 57 the Basic Law avoids such
pretensions. The king of Morocco is declared "sacred" and his person
inviolable; he is also the ultimate interpreter of shariah.58 The sultan of Oman
is likewise declared to enjoy sacralized legitimacy.5 9 The Wahhabi
interpretation of Islam, in contrast, does not allow for such claims, and the
Basic Law shies away from endowing the Saudi king with any sacred
qualities. The Wahhabi view entrusts the interpretation of Islamic law to its
historical guardians, the ulama, institutionalized in the Council of Senior
Ulama and the Department of Ifta and [Religious] Scholarly Research; 61 no
interpretative role or sanctified attributes are given to the Saudi king. Indeed,
the monarch, contrary to the usual privileges of kingship, is theoretically
subject to the law and cannot rise above it.
Besides the traditional Islamic constraints, rights and government
accountability must be sought in the more mundane realm of negotiations
among the elite and between them and the populace at large. Within the ruling
Saudi circles, for example-and the clear language of the Basic Law
notwithstanding-it is doubtful that the king would be able to name his crown
prince by edict without securing the prior consensus and blessing of the royal
family, or at least of its influential members. Similarly, it is questionable
whether a Saudi king could name his cabinet or the membership of the Shura
Council without some input from senior members of the ruling family.
Statutory law has proven to be a reasonably effective vehicle for
granting and protecting rights and allowing for more participatory politics.
The Basic Law, for instance, by relegating the regulation of some issues to
statutory development, has advanced a number of protections. 62 Likewise, a
criminal procedure statute enacted in 2001 offered significant improvements
in rights and protections relative to past practices. 63 Not only does the law
prohibit torture, mental coercion, and arbitrary arrest, but it grants the right to
57. In modem times, these claims probably originated in the first Ottoman Constitution, which
held the sultan both "sacred" and "not responsible." OT7OMAN CONST. art. 5, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 367 (Supp. 1908).
58. See, e.g., MOROCCO CoNsT. art. 23. The Moroccan king also holds the historically loaded
title of "amir al mu 'minin" (Commander of the Faithful), id. art. 19. The Constitution of Bahrain holds
that "the King's person is protected and untouchable." BAHR. CONST. art. 33. The Jordanian Constitution
holds that the king "is immune from any liability and responsibility." JORDAN CONST. art. 30.
59. See Nikolaus A. Siegfried, Legislation and Legitimation in Oman: The Basic Law, 7
ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 359 (2000).
60. The king himself, when announcing the promulgation of the Basic Law, emphasized that
"there is no difference between ruler and ruled and all are equal before God's shariah." See UMM AL-
QURA, no. 69, Mar. 6, 1992. Indeed, Wahhabi interpretation would not even allow the king to partake of
the venerable and ancient Muslim practice of mentioning the name of the sovereign in the Friday
sermon. Article 7 of the Ottoman Constitution, in contrast, invokes this right. OTTOMAN CONST., supra
note 57, art. 7.
61. Ifta is the response of a qualified jurisconsult to a particular legal question; it is the
practice of rendering fatwas.
62. See Royal Decree M/39, Oct. 15, 2001, reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3867, Nov. 3,
2001.
63. Human Rights Watch, Saudi Justice: Report Card Needed, http://hrw.org/press/-
2003/05/saudiO52803.htm (May 28, 2003).
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counsel during both interrogation and trial and offers safeguards against
arbitrary search and interception of communications. Concomitantly, the
Saudi legal profession has finally received formal recognition and a Code of
Legal Practice was promulgated in 2003.
64 Equally important, the resistance
65
to a civil procedure code for the shariah courts was finally overcome through
a long and detailed statute enacted in 2000, bringing uniformity and better
predictability to legal proceedings throughout the shariah system.
6 6
In the realm of private and public rights, while the Basic Law has a
mixed record, other avenues are still available to the citizenry to advance their
interests and secure more recognition and protection, including petitions
addressed directly to the king or his crown prince. The petition is a traditional
but at times controversial instrument through which any citizen (or sometimes
group) with a grievance can seek redress from the sovereign.67 While mostly
used to address private claims, this method has been occasionally extended to
demands concerning public policy. Essential to the acceptability of petitions is
their confidentiality, necessary to avoid embarrassing the sovereign as the
conventional conception of advice to Islamic rulers would dictate. However, it
did not take petitioners long to discover that publicity was an effective tool to
pressure decision-makers to undertake reforms, even if it drew their ire most
of the time.
Similarly, despite the Basic Law's silence with respect to freedom of
association and the growth of civil society, tentative steps have been taken in
both areas. Long skeptical about modem notions of human rights, the Saudi
authorities slowly came to the recognition that the wave of globalization and
domestic pressures required a more positive response. Accordingly, on March
9, 2004, a nongovernmental orfanization was established to that effect: the
National Human Rights Society. 8 While it cannot be described as vibrant, it is
nonetheless active in pursuing reports and complaints about human rights
abuses. In the same vein, in deference to global norms about workers' rights, a
compromise was reached by which large organizations (employing more than
one hundred people) are required to allow a labor committee to be organized
for collective representation.
64. See Royal Decree M/38, Oct. 16, 2001, reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3867, Nov. 3,
2001.
65. As a result of the generally hostile attitude displayed by shariah-trained judges to statutory
law, earlier attempts to enact a civil procedure code were unsuccessful. Just prior to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990, such a code was promulgated and was greeted with strong criticism by many
judges and ulama. The clamor during such a delicate period left the king no choice but to abrogate the
law within months.
66. Royal Decree M/21, The Law of Procedure before the Shariah Courts, Aug. 20, 2000,
reprinted in UMM AL-QURA, no. 3811, Sept. 16, 2000.
67. See BAsic LAW supra note 41, art. 43. Article 43 recognizes citizens' rights to petition the
king and his crown prince, but its language is carefully drawn, couched in terms of an individual, as
opposed to a collective, right. This drafting reflects the fact that concerted action is always strongly
discouraged, if not criminalized.
68. Attempts to set up civil groups to monitor human rights violations first came in the
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. In May 1993, a group of Saudi Islamist activists formed what they
called the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, which was eventually closed by the
government. More recently, a number of activists reportedly submitted an application to form a
nongovernmental human rights association to the ministry of social affairs in April 2003.
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Finally, the notion of consultation has been expanding over the last
decade or so. As discussed above, the powers of the Shura Council have been
modestly augmented and could potentially be reformed further. The Shura
Council's membership has also been enlarged from 60 to 150 to allow for
stronger regional representation and more varied strands of orientation. While
tame by any standard, the council's influence over laws and policy has been
steadily growing. To the surprise of many, the council's draft laws are
invariably adopted by the king. 9 Further, the council has taken a principled
stand against government efforts to impose taxes and fees, consistently
defeating measures to that effect, sometimes in the face of strong government
lobbying.70 The council is now assuming a higher profile, with some of its
deliberations beginning to be broadcast on local television. Equally significant
in the process of consultation was the establishment in 1999 of the Supreme
Economic Council, which is a mini-cabinet chaired by the crown prince and
charged with introducing and overseeing economic reform in the Kingdom.
Attached to this council is an Advisory Commission composed of sixteen
members drawn from the private business sector and some professionals. This
advisory body not only has the mandate to review government economic
policies and laws referred to it, but may also take the initiative to propose laws
and make policy recommendations. A plethora of other councils and
commissions with advisory boards have proliferated over the last decade,
covering fields such as education, health, and labor.
VIII. 9/11 AND ITS AFTERMATH
Over the last few years, public petitions have proved to be the most
noticeable and effective approach to lobby for and secure reform.71 Like the
impetus for the petitions of the prior decade, the tragic events of September
11, 2001, as well as the unprecedented pressures and international scrutiny to
which Saudi Arabia was subjected in their aftermath, provided the necessary
opening for the submission of petitions, sometimes with far-reaching
demands. The best known-and surprisingly acceptable-petition has been a
document drafted and signed by a sizeable number of the Saudi elite, both
religious and liberal, Sunni and Shiite, entitled A Vision for the Present and
Future of the Homeland, addressed to the crown prince in January 2003.72 The
willingness of the crown prince to receive publicly both the petition and
representatives of the signatories represented a clear break with past
69. Unofficial statistics indicate that so far, only three laws have been passed by the Council
but not adopted by royal decree.
70. This remarkable result is partly due to the fact that since the government does not involve
the council in matters of expenditure, the council is not in a position to rubberstamp the enhancement of
revenue without simultaneously having a say in how it is spent. This situation sometimes introduces
distortions into the economy, as when the council defeated a provision in the new tax code that would
have re-imposed an income tax on expatriate workers intended to make the Saudi labor force more
competitive vis-i-vis foreign workers.
71. Even before September 11, there were a few petitions submitted asking for reform,
including a Shiite request in 1993 for an enhancement of Shiite rights and an Islamist petition in 1999.
72. Petition, A Vision for the Present and Future of the Homeland (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with
the author).
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practices.73 The taboo against collective public demands was further lessened
by the semi-public way through which the leadership of the country sought
written input and comment on the petition from a cross-section of the
citizenry, along with subsequent efforts to implement some of the demands of
the petitioners.
The petition's demands have been partially met. The first municipal
elections, along the early 1977 model, were held in February through April of
2005 and were generally recognized to be fair and transparent. The petitions
have sparked a national dialogue that has broached, many previously taboo
subjects.75 Thus, for the first time, Wahhabi scholars agreed to sit with Saudi
Shiite and Sufi shaykhs and seemed to concede a limited notion of religious
pluralism in society.76 The same might also be said about the debate on
women and their proper role in a modem Islamic state (this dialogue had to be
carried on through an intercom system, since intermingling of the sexes is still
taboo).
7"
The reformers were impatient with the slow pace of reform and lodged
another petition in September 2003 entitled In Defense of the Homeland,
signed by 300 Saudis, including women and Shiites. Writing shortly after
73. Shortly thereafter, on April 30, 2003, the Shiite of the Eastern Province submitted their
own petition entitled Partners in the Homeland. Four hundred and fifty men and women signed the
document, in which they affirm their loyalty to the state and demand protections of their rights.
Apparently, the Ismaili minority in the south also weighed in with their own petition.
74. The demands of the 104 signatories are far-reaching. They include a revision of the Basic
Law and steps to further institutionalize governance, including elections for the Shura Council and
provincial councils, judicial independence, respect for human rights, a more active civil society, and
freedom of association. The petition further calls for more vigorous economic policies to lessen
dependence on oil, reduce the national debt, and provide services to the public. Finally, the petition
seeks to improve the rights of women, provide amnesty for and rehabilitation of reform activists, protect
freedom of expression, and institutionalize a public dialogue among various groups and sects of society.
75. The First National Dialogue was held in Riyadh on June 15-18, 2003, with participation
by a representative group reflecting "several intellectual spectra." It dealt with many of sensitive and
usually taboo concerns, such as religious pluralism, the role of women, fatwas, relations with non-
Muslims, the notion of jihad, and freedom of expression. Working papers were discussed in nine
sessions, after which a final communiqu6 was issued with recommendations of further open debate and
relaxation of some of the existing strictures. After proposals to institutionalize the National Dialogue,
there is now a national center for dialogue located in Riyadh. For more information on this and
subsequent National Dialogues, see The King Abdul-Aziz Center for National Dialog, at
http://www.kacnd.org.
76. The Second National Dialogue was held in Makkah on December 27-31, 2003, with
seventy-five participants, including women, on the theme Extremism and Moderation: A Comprehensive
and Systematic Vision. The conferees issued seventeen recommendations, some with significant
implications: number 3 urges "the acceleration of political reform and the enlargement of popular
participation through elections of the shura and regional councils, encouragement of the formation of
unions, voluntary organizations and civic institutions"; number 4 urges the separation of the executive,
legislative, and judicial authorities; number 5 calls for transparency and accountability in public finance;
number 6 calls for the renewal of religious discourse; number 7 rejects the individual fatwa in
connection with national issues; number 8 is a call for "opening the door for responsible free speech";
and number 14 urges fair trial and the provision of counsel for those accused of violence and terrorism.
77. The Third National Dialogue was held in Madinah on June 12-14, 2004, with the title
Women: Their Rights and Duties and Education. Eighty-eight participants, evenly divided between men
and women, issued a long list of recommendations characterized by an emphasis on practical issues and
avoidance of controversial matters. The most recent dialogue took place in Dammam on December 7-9,
2004, and dealt with youth issues. The session was preceded by workshops for youth all over the
country involving some 600 young men and women. The long list of recommendations concentrated on
improvements in education and reform of the labor market and relevant laws.
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violent attacks by al-Qaida on foreign and Saudi targets within Saudi territory,
the petitioners unequivocally condemned the violence and boldly declared
their belief that the failure to institute popular participation in governance was
one of the "principal" underlying causes of the attacks. Shortly thereafter, and
apparently emboldened by the (admittedly limited) success of their post-
September 11 petitions, a more determined group of the original signatories
drafted and circulated a stronger letter of demand, pointedly entitled
Constitutional Reform First, on December 16, 2003.78 Like the earlier
petitions, it was addressed to the crown prince and circulated over the Internet,
a vehicle the reformers still use widely to disseminate their views in light of
limited press freedom in Saudi Arabia. The 2003 petition, however, departed
from the early petitions in important ways. Like the September document, it
began by condemning the violence and urging a careful consideration of its
genesis. While eschewing "American and Zionist" claims that the religious
curriculum was responsible for this phenomenon, and condemning their
refusal to acknowledge that actions in Palestine and elsewhere were
contributory factors, the petitioners again identified the rise in violence as a
result of the lack of participatory politics in Saudi Arabia. Further, the draft is
composed of two parts, one addressing particular demands to the leadership
and the other aimed directly at the people, urging them to take participatory
politics seriously and to perform their sacred duty and be active, apparently a
veiled call to collective action. Another significant departure is the
introduction of the sensitive idea of "constitutional monarchy." These
innovations proved to be too much for the leadership and the signatories were
directly warned to cease and desist from their activities. Instead, more
petitions were filed.79 Subsequently, the leaders were arrested and those who
agreed to sign an undertaking to terminate their activities were duly released. 0
78. The petitioners point to the regression in popular participation from fifty years ago, during
the reign of the founder, King Abd al-Aziz, to the present day. The petition also bemoans the lack of
fundamental freedoms--of speech, assembly, association, or "responsible" thought. It demands that all
rights and freedoms enshrined in Islamic law be respected without discrimination of any kind and that
proper mechanisms be devised for their protection. It calls for: (1) the election of a national assembly
empowered to watch over domestic and foreign policies as well as public funds; (2) the separation of
powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and specifically for the independence of
the judiciary, its integrity, its unification, and the establishment of proper mechanisms to assure the
expeditious enforcement of judgments; (3) the formation of a constitutional court; (4) the free formation
of civic associations and unions, and grants of a right to public assembly and peaceful demonstrations;
(5) immediate constitutional reform in the form of a declared commitment to a "constitutional
monarchy" and the formation of an independent national commission to draft a new permanent
constitution based on shariah, to be the subject of a popular plebiscite within one year and to be applied
within three years.
79. Another petition followed on February 21, 2004, again addressed to the crown prince and
this time signed by more than 900 petitioners. Titled Together on the Road of Reform, this short
document simply reiterates earlier demands. After quoting a recent pronouncement by the crown prince
that "the State is continuing in the process of reform," that "no one will be permitted to stop it," and that
"freedom of thought" will not be penalized, they thank the crown prince for receiving the Vision for the
Present and Future of the Homeland and its signatories. They then implore the crown prince to
accelerate reforms as demanded in the earlier petition and promulgate a time schedule for their
implementation.
80. In March 2004, the government arrested thirteen leading reform advocates on charges that
they were involved in activities "that do not serve the unity of the country or the cohesion of a society
based on Islamic law." Most were released after reportedly signing statements promising not to speak
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IX. CONCLUSION
Despite its designation, the Saudi Basic Law is not the foundational
document that constitutions are meant to be. It represents a modest and long-
overdue step in recognizing the need to modernize the organization of a state
with increasingly sophisticated organs, and a tentative step in a process of
institutionalizing the state's relationship with its own increasingly complex
society. Moreover, for all its limitations, it is actually a realistic document-it
faithfully reflects the state of the relative powers held by the governing elite
and society. It does not promise more than it intends to deliver, nor does it
affect the functioning of the state or society in any profound way. It therefore
should not be surprising that when announcing the promulgation of the Basic
Law, King Fahd himself-after declaring that the Basic Law and the Shura
and Provinces Laws were not new but were actually "a codification of existing
conditions and an articulation of ongoing practices"--took the opportunity to
emphasize that such laws will be "subject to assessment and improvement as
the Kingdom's circumstances and interests dictate."'', Not only would the
Basic Law not foreclose the evolution of other laws, but it is itself subject to
further negotiations.
As noted at the beginning of this Essay, the Arab world is one of the last
bastions of authoritarian governance today. It has been observed that today's
Arab world is rich with constitutions that grant unchecked powers to the
executive, contain poorly developed rights provisions, and do not allow for
clear succession mechanisms or, when they do allow for them, fail to hold the
leadership accountable.82 Moreover, Arab constitutions are so riddled with
escape hatches that the rulers can constitutionally violate their own
constitutions. It is a world that develops constitutions for many purposes, but
not for the primary constitutional purpose of limiting power. In this context,
the Saudi Basic Law stands out as disarmingly candid. No pretense of limiting
executive authority and no offer of rights that are not intended to be upheld
are made. From the Saudi perspective, if modem nations have flags, national
anthems, and emblems, they also happen to have constitutions. In the final
analysis, perhaps the best way to view the Saudi document is as an ornament
of modernity, an accoutrement of sovereignty.
An ornament with modest substance, and in contrast with the ostensibly
democratic constitutions of the Arab states that simply mask authoritarian
rule, the Saudi Basic Law avoids excessive political hypocrisy that is the bane
of the "democratic" experiences in its neighborhood. In the Middle Eastern
states, deception-reigns supreme, no serious turnover in power occurs, no one
is held accountable despite the vast exercise in "elections" and "plebiscites,"
and citizens are routinely repressed despite the panoply of rights explicitly
"guaranteed" to them. Under such conditions, popular disenchantment with
publicly or to agitate for reform; three remain imprisoned. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Saudi Arabia, in
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41731.htm (Feb. 28, 2005).
81. See UMM AL-QURA, no. 69, Mar. 6, 1992.
82. BROwN, supra note 41, at 13.
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participatory politics and the promise of freedom is a natural outcome, making
the realization of these goals even more difficult. By promising basically
nothing it could (or would) not deliver, while at the same time offering an
opening for further evolution, the Saudi limited exercise in constitutional
reform may be more promising. By frankly showing the limits of what the
ruling elite is willing to concede, the Basic Law leaves it to the various
segments of society to negotiate their demands and to mobilize with the
implicit understanding that it is a potentially meaningful exercise. The recent
campaigns demanding that the ruling elite allow certain rights and accept
certain limits, and the resistance they have engendered, could be interpreted as
testimony to the fact that all parties understand that such changes, if
implemented, would be consequential and not just an engagement in a
fraudulently democratic exchange.
